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Sou uma ficção... 
Que ando eu a querer de mim  
ou de tudo neste mundo? 
(PESSOA, 2014: 311-312) 
 
1. Introduction 
Fictionalism is a contemporarily discussed philosophical position that can 
roughly be characterized as the view that claims made within a region of 
discourse “are not best seen as aiming at literal truth but are better regarded as 
a sort of ‘fiction’” (EKLUND 2011). Recently, several scholars have defended 
fictionalism about mathematical discourse and scientific theories, ordinary 
object discourse, and finally, about truth and value judgements (moral 
fictionalism).1 All of these positions are grounded on a crucial distinction 
between a linguistic and an ontological thesis. According to “the linguistic thesis 
[…] utterances of sentences of the discourse are best seen not as efforts to say 
what is literally true, but as useful fictions of some sort. The ontological thesis, 
by contrast, is the thesis that the entities characteristic of the discourse do not 
exist, or have the ontological status of fictional entities” (EKLUND, 2011). The 
very root of philosophical fictionalism is Hans Vaihinger’s The Philosophy of “As 
if” (1911). In that book, Vaihinger gave fictionalism its most complete 
expression and therefore, Vaihinger’s work is a fundamental reference for 
understanding the contemporary debate on that concept.2 As will be shown, 
Vaihinger particularly focuses on the practical function of human intellect and 
“supports the thesis that we must not see scientific theories as representing 
outer reality, but only as instruments to manage it” (CEYNOWA, 1993: 9). Thus, 
basically, Vaihinger is interested in epistemology and in the practical 
consequences of our being conscious of the fictional character of our world-
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1 For an exhaustive bibliography on this topic, see Eklund (2011). On moral fictionalism see also Döring 
and Bahadir (2014). It is worth noting that over the last decade some scholars have discussed the 
possibility of ascribing Nietzsche a fictionalist interpretation of value judgements (see e.g. Hussain 2007). 
2 On this point, see Neuber (2014).  
description. In what follows we will address fictionalism on Vaihinger’s view. 
Moreover, in this paper “psychological fictionalism” means a fictionalist 
conception of the subject, that is, the view that claims that psychological entities 
such as subject, I, ego, or soul are only useful fictions, and that our 
consciousness of their being fictional entities has important practical 
consequences. 
This is the necessary premise of this paper, the aim of which is to 
compare Nietzsche’s and Pessoa’s conception of the subject. In particular, we 
shall argue that both Nietzsche and Pessoa defend a psychological fictionalism, 
and that that position is the ground of some of their most important reflections. 
Moreover, the comparison between Nietzsche’s and Pessoa’s fictionalist 
conception of the subject is possible via Vaihinger – and maybe only through 
him. In fact, as will be shown in what follows, Vaihinger is the indirect 
connection between Pessoa and Nietzsche on this particular topic. First, 
Vaihinger developed his fictionalism by making reference to a neo-Kantian 
framework, the same framework that influenced Nietzsche. Second, Vaihinger 
made reference to Nietzsche himself and quoted several unpublished writings 
where Nietzsche talks about the I and the subject as mere fictions. Finally, 
Vaihinger’s view waslater summarized by George R. S. Mead in his Quests Old 
and New (1913), which was subsequently read by Pessoa. Thus, in Mead’s book 
Pessoa found an outline of Vaihinger’s fictionalism, which, in turn, was 
grounded on an interpretation of several Nietzsche’s statements. In fact, as we 
can see from a note written in the flyleaf of Pessoa’s personal copy of Mead’s 
book, Pessoa developed Vaihinger’s fundamental thesis into a non-
substantialist view of subject and consciousness. 
In what follows, the attention will be first directed to Nietzsche’s 
conception of the I and subject, where we particularly focus on his stating the 
fictional character of all these notions (sec. 2). Accordingly, we then provide a 
brief outline of Vaihinger’s The Philosophy of “As-if”, paying special regard to 
those chapters where he defines the concept of “fiction” and stresses that 19th 
century psychologists agree “that the concept of ‘soul’ is only a fiction” (sec. 3). 
Finally, we turn to Pessoa, and deal with the psychological fictionalism that 
emerges from the unpublished note on Vaihinger (sec. 4).  
 
 
2. Nietzsche: The I as a “fiction” 
The I becomes a particularly important object of investigation in Nietzsche’s 
late writings because it is one of the distinctive elements of the Western 
worldview and its metaphysics of substance. Nietzsche’s most significant 
reflections on the I – which he sees as the question on the substantial referent of 
psychic phenomena – occur in the first book of Beyond Good and Evil, devoted to 
the “prejudices of philosophers”, and are later developed in Twilight of the Idols. 
In these works, Nietzsche presents the final outcome of a theoretical discussion 
of the subject (particularly of the “I” qua subject) that he developed since the 
early 1880s and that we also find treated in his Nachlaß.3 From this theoretical 
discussion emerges Nietzsche’s non-realist or fictionalist conception of the 
subject, which is the topic of this paper.4 
In the first book of Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche takes a stand against 
all philosophical approaches that are unable to give up the common sense view 
of the I and thus calls into question the legitimacy of using the proposition “I 
think” as an immediate certainty (BGE 16).5 Nietzsche argues that, in order to be 
able to discuss this issue, one would have to answer “a set of bold claims that 
are difficult to establish”, and concludes that  
  
in place of that “immediate certainty” which may, in this case, win the faith of the 
people, the philosopher gets handed a whole assortment of metaphysical questions, 
genuinely probing intellectual questions of conscience, such as: “Where do I get the 
concept of thinking from? Why do I believe in causes and effects? What gives me the 
right to speak about an I, and, for that matter, about an I as cause, and, finally, about an 
I as the cause of thoughts?”  
(BGE 16) 
 
The kinds of problems raised by Nietzsche are clear. He particularly 
focuses on the popular belief in an I as substance, that is to say, in the existence 
of a causally efficacious substrate of our psychical activity. This, according to 
Nietzsche, is a fundamental error of our self-representation, as he famously 
argues in Twilight of the Idols. First, in TI, “Reason” in Philosophy, 5, Nietzsche 
blames the “basic presupposition of the metaphysics of language – in the 
vernacular: the presuppositions of reason” for clearing the way to a “crudely 
fetishistic mindset. It sees doers and deeds all over: […] it believes in the ‘I’, in 
the I as being, in the I as substance, and it projects this belief in the I-substance 
onto all things. […] Being is imagined in everything – pushed under everything – 
as a cause.” Then, in TI, The Four Great Errors, 3 (“Error of false causation”), 
                                                 
3 On this topic see LUPO (2006). 
4 Sebastian GARDNER (2009: 1) argues that “there is a striking lack of fit between the (non-realist or 
fictionalist) conception of the self that emerges from Nietzsche’s theoretical discussion of the self, and the 
(realist, or at any rate non-fictionalist) conception of the self that is presupposed by his practical 
philosophy” (we prefer to talk about “subject” (or “I”) instead of “self”, since in Nietzsche Subject (or Ich) 
and Selbst are quite different concepts. See e.g. Za, On the Despisers of the Body). In this paper we aim to 
outline Nietzsche’s psychological fictionalism and will thus not deal with the question posed by Gardner. 
Nevertheless, as Gori recently stated, Nietzsche’s rejection of the I on the theoretical plane does not 
necessarily contrast the psychology presupposed by his practical philosophy (in other words, it is arguable 
that “Nietzsche’s critique of the I […] does not prohibit the human being from referring to its own 
subjectivity – provided, however, that the latter is conceived of in a different way, that is, stripped from its 
metaphysical surface.” (GORI, 2015a: 192). Moreover, as we shall show at the end of this section, 
Nietzsche’s fictionalist conception of the subject plays a fundamental role in his late practical philosophy. 
5 Quotations from, and references to, Nietzsche’s writings make use of the following abbreviations: ‘GS’ 
for The Gay Science, ‘Za’ for Thus Spoke Zarathustra, ‘BGE’ for Beyond Good and Evil, ‘GM’ for On the 
Genealogy of Morality, ‘TI’ for Twilight of the Idols, ‘PF’ for Posthumous Fragments. Nietzsche’s works are cited 
by abbreviation, chapter title or number (when applicable), and section number. Posthumous fragments 
are cited by year, group and, fragment number, as they appear in the Colli and Montinari standard edition 
(NIETZSCHE, 1967-). The posthumous fragments marked with (*) are quoted in the final chapter of 
Vaihinger’s The Philosophy of “As-if”: Nietzsche and his Doctrine of Conscious Illusion (VAIHINGER, 1925: 341 
ff.). 
Nietzsche states that “the conception of a consciousness (‘mind’) as a cause, and 
then that of the I (the ‘subject’) as a cause are just latecomers [‘inner facts’] that 
appeared once” that of “will as causal agent […] was established and given.” But, 
continues Nietzsche, “the ‘inner world’ is full of illusions and phantasms: will is 
one of them. […] Not to mention the I! That has become a fairy tale, a fiction 
[Fiktion], a play on words: it has stopped thinking, feeling, and willing 
altogether!”  
In these published writings Nietzsche deals with the problem of 
subjectivity by arguing that the concept of “I” (or “subject”) is only 
surreptitiously introduced into a purely necessary dynamic. The value of that 
concept is therefore merely logical, and in no way can we affirm its existence on 
the ontological plane. As we suggested above, this view is the final outcome of 
a reflection that Nietzsche developed during the 1880s, and in the Nachlaß we 
find his psychological fictionalism most clearly stated. In several notebooks 
Nietzsche particularly focuses on the purely fictional nature of the I, with 
emphasis on the general characteristics of the activity of thought, which he 
describes in purely physiological terms. The I is considered as the product of a 
secondary activity of thought which intervenes in ascribing a subject to a 
process that is constitutively free of it: 
 
I don't concede that the “I” is what thinks. Instead, I take the I itself to be a construction 
of thinking […]; in other words, to be only a regulative fiction with the help of which a 
kind of constancy and thus “knowability” is inserted into, invented into, a world of 
becoming. […] It is only thinking that posits the I: but up to now philosophers have 
believed, like the “common people”, that in “I think” there lay something or other of 
unmediated certainty and that this “I” was the given cause of thinking.  
(PF 1885, 35[35]*) 
 
The I, as a product of thought, is nothing more than a conceptual entity 
whose value is limited to practical usefulness with a view to a categorization of 
the world. According to this perspective, the I belongs to the sphere of those 
substantial elements to which one is used to attributing absolute existence and 
whose origin lies in the translation of the outside world into a language that can 
be understood and used by our intellect.6 In Nietzsche’s view, however, the I 
has a feature that distinguishes it from other substantial entities that arise from 
the simplification of a chaotic multiplicity through isolation of fixed and 
uniform forms. In order to give unity to feelings, perceptions, and memories 
one looks for something that is able to act as a source of such dispositions – as 
their “cause.” The unification of the multiplicity of sensations is made through 
identification of a spiritual entity, whose delimitation is not made otherwise 
than from its ability to act and for this reason it has no sense wanting to ascribe 
an existential value to it, as if it were possible to indicate and describe that from 
which an action springs in instances where all that is possible to ascertain are 
the effects of the action itself.In Nietzsche’s interpretation, the subject is nothing 
                                                 
6 On this topic see GORI (2009). On the adaptive value of substance concepts see also GS 110 and 111. 
but a creation of the activity of representation, an erroneous simplification 
generated by thinking that one can “designate as such the force which posits, 
invents, thinks, as distinct from all individual positing, inventing, thinking” (PF 
1885, 2 [152]).7 We are moving within the general perspective that is 
synthetically expressed in Nietzsche’s conclusion in GM I 13, according to 
which “there is no ‘being’ behind the deed, its effect and what becomes of it; 
‘the doer’ is invented as an afterthought, – the doing is everything.”8 If we 
apply this remark to the case of psychic phenomena, we easily see that it 
answers the question about the relation between body and mind. Nietzsche 
reflects in particular on human thought, noticing that it is not distinguished 
from the physiological activity that determines it and that, as a result, there is 
no subject-object dualism to substantiate it. There is no author of thoughts. The 
latter arise from the organism’s inner processes.9 In the same way, there is no 
subject distinct from the sensations generated by our perceptive faculty: they 
appear spontaneously to us and only afterwards do they enter consciousness 
and are, thus, organized and understood. It is only at this point that the I’s 
“regulative fiction” steps in. The latter is nothing but a logical support for the 
categorization of sensations (that are thus related to a unitary substrate), its 
usefulness being as undeniable as is its ontological inconsistency. 
Stripped of the ontological value traditionally ascribed to it by 
psychology and of its autonomy from the chain of sensations, the I reveals its 
logical-fictional character. A few years later, Nietzsche takes his argument to 
extremes and suggests the complete exclusion of the subject-act dualism as a 
fiction:  
  
“Thinking”, as posited by the theorists of knowledge, simply doesn't occur: it is a quite 
arbitrary fiction achieved by selecting one element from the process and subtracting all 
the others, an artificial trimming for the purpose of intelligibility… The “mind”, 
something that thinks: maybe even “the mind absolute, pure, unmixed” – this 
conception is a derivative, second consequence of the false self-observation that believes 
                                                 
7 The will to find a subject-agent located beneath the unfolding of events is a theme Nietzsche has 
addressed at length, deploring, in particular, the human being’s tendency to anthropomorphize natural 
dynamics. This is evident, for example, in the case of the interpretation of the link between cause and 
effect. The latter is the model of a purely necessary dynamic, which however, is commonly described in 
terms of human agency, even an intentional one. The tendency, that is, is to project in things a familiar 
model of activity that ascribes subjective characteristics to the force that moves material reality (see PF 
1885, 2 [83] and 1888, 14 [95]).  
8 This conclusion is incorporated in the above quoted passage from TI, “Reason” in Philosophy, 5 and in PF 
1887-1888, 11 [113]*, where Nietzsche states that “both doing and doer are fictions” (see below). 
9 Nietzsche’s most explicit discussion of the physiological conception of thought can be found in PF 1884, 
26[92] and 1885, 38[1]. In these notes Nietzsche refers to a form of conscious thought, which he considers a 
simple sign of an activity that takes place at a “pre-psychological” level (see LUPO, 2006: 107 ff. On this 
topic see also ABEL, 2001; EMDEN, 2005; and GORI, 2015a). Nietzsche’s claim of a “superficial” character of 
consciousness (GS 354) leads to the open debate about whether Nietzsche defends a strong 
epiphenomenalism or not. Such a view is developed in LEITER (2002) and in RICCARDI (forthcoming), while 
Katsafanas (2005) argues against the strong epiphenomenalist reading. Lupo (2009) also argues that 
Nietzsche rejects a metaphysical view of consciousness (as a faculty), but accepts an epiphenomenal view 
of it (even if not a strong one). We basically follow Lupo, since it seems to us that his view is the most 
coherent with Nietzsche’s statements from the Nachlaß 1884-1885. Nevertheless, it is not our intention to 
intervene in that debate which exceeds the aims of this paper. 
in “thinking:” here first an act is imagined that doesn't occur, “thinking,” and secondly 
a subject-substratum is imagined in which every act of this thinking, and nothing else, 
originates; i.e., both doing and doer are fictions.  
(PF 1887-1888, 11[113]*)10 
 
In this passage Nietzsche is, of course, referring to a form of conscious 
thought, the culmination of a chain of processes enacted at a physiological level, 
of which only the final outcome can be apprehended. Both agents in this 
relation are the product of the translation of physiological dynamics in a 
language we can understand. Thus, they are mutually dependent on a logical 
level, and, as is the case with the “true” and “apparent” world spoken of in 
Twilight of the Idols, the elimination of the one entails the elimination of the 
other. For Nietzsche, there is actually no “thinking” except as the ceaseless 
articulation of drives and instincts in the organism, just as there is no “mind”, a 
subject identifiable as “something that thinks”. Mind and thought can be defined 
only in relation to each other; once the former’s ontological inconsistency is 
revealed, the latter loses meaning as well. Dualism is, therefore, overcome. In 
fact on this conception, it is completely eliminated. 
As has recently been demonstrated, Nietzsche’s reflections on whether 
and on what basis is it possible to speak of the I as the cause of thoughts, are 
grounded on a neo-Kantian framework.11 In particular, Nietzsche’s rejection of 
Descartes’ “I think” can be contextualized by making reference to the 
contemporary debate on “scientific psychology” that included Friedrich A. 
Lange.12 The I of which Nietzsche speaks in BGE 16 does not differ from the 
soul discussed by Lange in his History of Materialism, nor is it different from 
what the Austrian physicist Ernst Mach called, in the same years, the “ideal 
mental-economic unity” that science claimed to be able to locate within the 
brain.13 In particular, the main problem Mach addresses is the relation between 
body and I (matter and spirit), an issue widely debated during the nineteenth 
century by those thinkers who privileged scientific themes in the work of Kant - 
particularly those relating to problems of psychology and anthropology.14 Both 
Mach and Lange faced the limitations of the explanations of the body/soul 
                                                 
10 In the Nachlaß from 1880 to 1888 we find other textual evidence of Nietzsche’s fictionalist conception of 
the subject. For example, in PF 1880, 6[340]* Nietzsche argues that “it is probably due to our lack of 
development that we believe in things and assume something permanent in becoming, that we believe in 
an ego,” whereas “the subject is only a fiction, and there is no ego, either” (PF 1887, 9[108]*). Nietzsche, in 
particular, denies the causal efficacy of the subject (“the ‘subject’ is not something that effects, but merely a 
fiction,” PF 1887, 9[91]*), and rejects the popular view that there is a substratum of our psychical activity 
(“‘subject’ is the fiction implying that many similar conditions in us are the effect of a substratum… this is to 
be denied,” PF 1887, 10[19]). Finally, Nietzsche also argues that “the ‘soul’ itself is an expression of all the 
phenomena of consciousness which, however, we interpret as the cause of all these phenomena,” and, 
consequently, “‘self-consciousness’ is a fiction” (PF 1885-86, 1[58]*). 
11 On this topic, see LOUKIDELIS (2013) and GORI (2015a). 
12 As stressed e.g. in STACK (1983), Lange’s History of Materialism strongly influenced Nietzsche. In Lange’s 
work Nietzsche found a detailed and updated exposition of the latest publications in psychology. This 
reference is quite important in this paper, since Lange also influenced Vaihinger (see below, sec. 3). 
13 MACH (1914: 22). Mach already focused on this topic in his Beiträge zur Analyse der Empfindungen, 
published in 1886 and purchased by Nietzsche (see GORI, 2009 and 2015a). 
14 On this topic see Lehmann (1987). 
relation provided both by the materialism and the physiology of sense organs 
typical of psychology, and raised the possibility of establishing a “psychology 
without a soul”. In so doing, they became spokesmen for a goal of considerable 
philosophical significance; the fact that contemporary psychology no longer 
needed to refer to a substantial ground of psychic functions is what brought 
about its liberation from the old scholastic metaphysics.  
As can easily be seen, scientific psychology’s demand to get free from the 
remnants of an age-old metaphysics that surreptitiously attempted to introduce 
something that it could not specify or measure, corresponds to Nietzsche’s 
stressing the pure fictional character of the I. Moreover, it is arguable that 
Nietzsche is referring (most likely via Lange) to scientific psychology’s widely 
debated outcomes when he claims that “nowadays we do not believe” in the 
illusory character of our “inner facts” (TI, Errors, 3), or when he argues that “we 
have become quite convinced that our concept of ‘I’ guarantees nothing in the 
way of a real unity” (PF 1888, 14[79]*. Emphasis our in both the quotations). But 
what characterizes Nietzsche’s view is the attention that he pays to the practical 
consequences of our having finally become aware of this fictionalism. This is 
particularly clear if we consider the aim of Nietzsche’s late philosophy – with 
special regard to TI, where Nietzsche explicitly states the fictional character of 
the I.  
First, TI can be ascribed to Nietzsche’ general s anti-Christian aim. In that 
book, Nietzsche particularly focuses on the negative consequences that 
Christian morality had on the human type and attacks its basic principles. The 
belief in an “I” as cause of our own actions is one of those principles. In fact, 
without the reference to it, no guilt or responsibility can be ascribed to anyone. 
Thus, stressing the fictional character of the I deprives Christianity of its 
power.15 Nietzsche clearly shows this in the section on The Four Great Errors, 
which particularly concerns the concepts of “false causation” and “imaginary 
causes,” to which belongs “the entire realm of morality and religion” (TI, The 
Four Great Errors 6). As regards causation, Nietzsche stresses that “people have 
always believed that they knew what a cause was,” and “that our acts of will 
were causally efficacious.” Moreover, as for Nietzsche, no one “could deny that 
thoughts have causes” and “that the ‘I’ is what causes thoughts.” Otherwise, he 
concludes, “the action could hardly be considered free, and nobody could really 
be held responsible for it” (TI, The Four Great Errors 3). This stance is quite 
problematic, however, since, as Nietzsche argues, we get this belief “from the 
famous realm of the ‘inner facts,’ none of which have ever proven factual.” On 
the contrary, “the ‘inner world’ is full of illusions and phantasms” and the “‘I’ 
(the ‘subject’) […] has [nowadays] become a fairy tale, a fiction, a play on 
words” (ibid.) (TI, The Four Great Errors 3).  
                                                 
15 The question of the I can be extended to include that of the soul. By doing this, we move from a classical 
problem for philosophy and psychology to more delicate issues concerning religion in general and 
Christianity in particular. See BGE 54, where Nietzsche develops his criticism towards Descartes’ “I think” 
and argues that modern philosophy is “anti-Christian”. On the question of human guilt and responsibility 
see also BGE 21. 
The practical consequences of Nietzsche’s fictional conception of the 
subject are even clearer if we consider a second point, i.e. the specific aim of TI 
and its relation with Nietzsche’s attempt to provide a revaluation of the 
traditional values. In particular, Nietzsche expects his attack on the “eternal 
idols” generated by Western (Platonic and Christian) metaphysics to have a 
transformative effect on human beings.16 In fact, Nietzsche’s “diagnosis” of the 
realized human being suggests that the human being who believed in the value 
of substantial entities such as “I”, “will”, etc., out of the mere practical plane, 
finally becomes smaller, weaker – décadent. In Nietzsche’s view, in order to 
provide a counter-movement against Christian morality, we must contrast this 
belief, and that can be done by “sounding out” the idols, thus revealing their 
hollowness (TI, Preface). As we can see, according to this view there is no need 
to completely reject these idols. In fact, Nietzsche denies their value on the 
metaphysical plane, but also stresses their “biological utility for human being’s 
preservation” (PF 1888, 14[153]). According to him, “the aberration of 
philosophy is that, instead of seeing in logic and the categories of reason means 
toward the adjustment of the world for utilitarian ends […], one believed one 
possessed in them the criterion of truth and reality” (PF 1888, 14[153]). This 
belief is what actually produced a weak human being, and this is thus what 
“future philosophers” must avoid. Therefore, for Nietzsche, the awareness of 
the pure fictional (i.e. logical) character of such concepts as that of “I” would 
have a strong transformative effect on the type of man. In other words, 
according to him, it makes a big difference for the human being to conceive the 
I as causally efficacious, or to conceive it as if it were causally efficacious. This is 
actually crucial for Nietzsche, since on this difference lies the possibility of 
generating a higher human type. Roughly put, while common people believe in 
the existence of an I as the cause of thoughts, “future philosophers” will consider 
it as a mere tool for practical purposes – thus, not completely getting rid of it.17  
As we shall see in the following section, Nietzsche’s claim – grounded on 
the outcomes of scientific psychology – that “we have become quite convinced 
that our concept of ‘I’ guarantees nothing in the way of a real unity” (PF 1888, 
14[79]*) and that, consequently, we can finally see it only as a tool in order to 
orient ourselves to the world (and not as a substance concept), correspond to 
Vaihinger’s fictionalist perspective. 
 
 
3. Vaihinger: fictionalism, or the “critical standpoint”  
In The Philosophy of “As-if” (first published in 1911 after almost 30 years of 
work), Hans Vaihinger presents an original philosophical perspective grounded 
on 19th century neo-Kantian epistemology. This book is particularly important 
for the recent debates about philosophical fictionalism, since it constitutes the 
                                                 
16 On the aims of TI and its relation with Nietzsche’s projected Revaluation of all values, see GORI (2015b). 
17 This view has been recently defended in GORI (2015b), with particular reference to the concepts of “I” 
and “freedom”. 
very root of that position. In fact, in The Philosophy of “As-if” we find an in-depth 
and exhaustive investigation of the concept of “fiction”, the basis of 
whichVaihinger programmatically aimed to lay out, as the subtitle of his main 
work suggests: “A system of the theoretical, practical and religious fictions of 
mankind” (NEUBER, 2014: 9). Given the aim of this paper, we shall only briefly 
outline Vaihinger’s view in order to show the similarities with Nietzsche – 
similarities that Vaihinger himself noticed and stressed in the final section of his 
book (Nietzsche and his Doctrine of Conscious Illusion).  
As summarized by Ceynowa (1993: 9), “The Philosophy of ‘As-if’ supports 
the thesis that we must not see scientific theories as representing outer reality, 
but only as instruments to manage it.” This thesis is particularly “grounded on 
the idea that the human intellect has a fundamental practical function,” since it 
creates a manageable world-image that helps human self-preservation (ibid.). 
Vaihinger (1925: 170) explicitly states that “knowledge is a secondary purpose, 
[…] the primary aim [of logical thinking] being the practical attainment of 
communication and action.” This is better argued in the opening page of the 
first part of The Philosophy of “As-if”, where Vaihinger presents the basic 
principles of his view:  
 
The object of the world of ideas as a whole is not the portrayal of reality – this would be 
an utterly impossible task – but rather to provide us with an instrument for finding our 
way about more easily in this world. Subjective processes of thought (…) represent the 
highest and ultimate result of organic development, and the world of ideas is the fine 
flower of the whole cosmic process; but for that very reason it is not a copy of it in the 
ordinary sense.  
(VAIHINGER, 1925: 15) 
 
It is easy to see that Vaihinger’s fictionalism is first contrasted with a 
correspondence theory of truth – that is, the idea that our knowledge is a copy 
of outer reality. In his view, human knowledge is only the final product of a 
biological development and its value is merely instrumental. Moreover, 
Vaihinger holds that our mind is “assimilative and constructive,” and that 
“logical thought is an active appropriation of the outer world, a useful organic 
elaboration of the material sensation” (VAIHINGER, 1925: 1).18 Thus, according to 
him, the “psyche” (to be understood not as a substance, but rather as “the 
organic whole of all so-called ‘mental’ actions and reactions”, ibid.) is an organic 
formative force, which independently changes what has been appropriated 
(VAIHINGER, 1925: 2). Finally, Vaihinger considers scientific thought as a 
function of the psyche and calls “fictions” the products of its activity: “The 
fictive activity of the mind is an expression of the fundamental psychical forces; 
fictions are mental structures” (VAIHINGER, 1925: 12). 
                                                 
18 Michael Heidelberger (2014: 53) directly compared Vaihinger’s view of human thought as a “biological 
function” with Ernst Mach’s epistemology. 
This view is strongly influenced by Lange’s History of Materialism.19 In 
that book, Vaihinger found an exposition of the most important topics debated 
by German neo-Kantian thinkers and scientists during the second half of the 
19th century. In particular, Lange made reference to the studies of the German 
physiologist Johannes Müller and focused on the epistemological value of sense 
organs (see CEYNOWA, 1993: 134 f.). As for Lange, “pure” knowledge is not 
possible; anything we know is first moulded by our sense organs, and therefore 
by our intellect and its logical structure. This is coherent with the development 
of Kant’s epistemology that Lange aimed to provide and whose radicalization 
led to Vaihinger’s philosophical position.20 In Vaihinger’s view, his own 
fictionalism – that is, the idea that “psychical constructs […] are only fictions, 
i.e. conceptual and ideational aids,” and “not hypotheses relating to the nature 
of reality” – is in fact a “‘critical’ standpoint” (VAIHINGER, 1925: 177). 
The reference to neo-Kantianism is particularly important in order to 
understand Vaihinger’s philosophical perspective, since it leads to the 
fundamental and widely debated question of the “thing in itself”, and 
consequently, to the problematic concept of “subject” or “soul.” From what has 
been shown above, it follows that Vaihinger considers the scientific concepts as 
having a merely logical value. Vaihinger particularly stresses this point, and in 
a way comparable to Nietzsche’s stating the four great errors of human reason, 
deplores the traditional “error” of “attributing to the means value which really 
belongs exclusively to what is achieved by the means” (VAIHINGER, 1925: 167). 
In other words, Vaihinger argues that, whereas “concept and proposition serve 
merely as a means for communication […], the psyche believes that it has 
grasped something when it has merely applied its fictional categories to the 
sensation-complex” (VAIHINGER, 1925: 169). The final result of this fundamental 
error is thus the creation of the concept of substance, which – to use Nietzsche’s 
words – is “pushed under” the world of experience: 
 
We get the fiction of a substance, supposed to exist outside the realm of experienced 
objects, which then become mere attributa or modi of the substance. In the same way 
there arises the fiction of an absolute cause of which the world of experience is 
supposed to be the effect; […] and finally we get the fiction of the “Thing in itself” 
which is supposed to be the essence of phenomena. All these are unjustified 
transference-fictions, since a relationship which only has a meaning within the sphere 
of experience is extended beyond this into the void.  
(VAIHINGER, 1925: 165-166)  
 
That of “thing in itself” is maybe the most representative case of a fiction 
whose value has been misunderstood, as if it were not merely logical. In dealing 
with that concept, Vaihinger particularly draws his view, and introduces the 
question of the subject: 
                                                 
19 As we read in Vaihinger (1925: xxxv), in Lange he found “a master, a guide, an ideal teacher.” Vaihinger 
particularly devotes to Lange’s “Standpoint of the Ideal” one section of the third part (Historical 
Confirmations) of his The Philosophy of “As-if”. On the influence of Lange on Vaihinger see CEYNOWA (1993: 
chap. 3) and HEIDELBERGER (2014).  
20 See HEIDELBERGER (2014: 51) ff. and VAIHINGER (1925: XXXVI, n.1). 
 
Only within the world of ideas are there things, things that are causes; in the real world 
these ideas are but empty echoes. The fiction of the Ding an sich would be the most 
brilliant of all conceptual instruments. Just as we introduce into mathematics and 
mechanics ideas which facilitate our task, so Kant introduces a device in the form of the 
concept Ding an sich, as an x to which a y, the ego, as our organization, corresponds. By 
this means the whole world of reality can be dealt with. Subsequently the “ego” and the 
Ding an sich are dropped, and only sensations remain as real. From our point of view, 
the sequence of sensations constitutes ultimate reality, and two poles are mentally 
added, subject and object.  
(VAIHINGER, 1925: 75-76) 
 
In complete agreement with Lange and other contemporary neo-Kantian 
thinkers (see e.g. MACH, 1914: chap. 1), Vaihinger argues that the “ultimate 
reality” is constituted by sensations. For him, the logical fictions are only means 
to make reality manageable, for example, by marking relatively stable 
complexes of sensations, or by introducing imaginary causes, thus giving 
direction and – particularly – meaning to the flux of sensations. The two 
substance concepts of subject and object are therefore a product of what we 
could call the “error of the unjustified extension” deplored by Vaihinger. 
According to his “critical standpoint”, there is no “subject” as much as there is 
no “object”: they are both only creations of our thought, “instruments for finding 
our way about more easily in this world” to which anything out of the world of our 
experience does not correspond. 
As can now be seen, Vaihinger’s view can be compared with that of 
Nietzsche: they both claim the pure logical value of the categories of reason; 
they both stress the role of these categories as tools for the preservation of the 
species; and finally, they both evaluate the introduction of imaginary causes of 
the empirical world of experiences as a fundamental error of popular thought. 
It is worth noting that Vaihinger acknowledged this similarity and mentioned 
Nietzsche among the “historical confirmations” of his own philosophical 
perspective. In the final section of his book, Vaihinger particularly stressed that 
Nietzsche recognized “that life and science are not possible without imaginary 
or false conceptions” and “that false ideas must be employed both in science 
and life by intellectually mature people and with the full realization of their 
falsity.” Finally, he argued that “it was Lange, in all likelihood, who in this case 
served as his guide” (VAIHINGER, 1925: 341).21 Unfortunately, we cannot 
adequately develop this topic in this paper. In the few pages left, before turning 
to Pessoa, we will just make one final step to show Vaihinger’s view of the 
concept of “soul.” 
                                                 
21 Just a few lines below this passage, Vaihinger states once more that “Nietzsche, like Lange, emphasizes 
the great significance of ‘appearances’ in all the various field of science and life,” and then claims that “this 
Kantian or, if you will, neo-Kantian origin of Nietzsche’s doctrine has hitherto been completely ignored. 
[…] As a matter of fact there is a great deal of Kant in Nietzsche […], of the spirit of Kant, of the real Kant 
who understood the nature of appearance through and through, but who, in spite of having seen through 
it, also consciously saw and recognized its usefulness and necessity” (VAIHINGER, 1925: 341-2). 
Vaihinger’s psychological fictionalism directly follows from his general 
view of scientific concepts and since the latter is grounded on the neo-Kantian 
debate, corresponds to the perspective of scientific psychology that we 
presented in the previous section. In particular, Vaihinger considers the concept 
of “soul” as one of the several “verbal fictions […] employed in all the 
sciences.” According to his fictionalism, these are “nothing but summational 
expressions for a series of interconnected phenomena and interconnected 
processes, (…) although [they] were formerly, and are still to-day regarded as 
expressions for real and existing entities” (VAIHINGER, 1925: 211-212). 
Furthermore, Vaihinger states that: 
 
[…] in the scientific world to-day everyone is agreed that the concept of “soul” is only a 
fiction. We still speak of a soul as if there were such a thing as a separated, integral and 
simple soul-entity, though we are quite conscious that it is only a fiction. The “soul” is 
simply a summational fiction without any reality. (…) On our “critical” view, the “soul” 
is simply a convenient aid for indicating the totality of psychical phenomena. We speak 
as if a soul existed.  
(VAIHINGER, 1925: 213) 
 
We can also directly compare Vaihinger’s and Nietzsche’s views on this 
point. As we have shown, Nietzsche was influenced by the neo-Kantian 
framework too, and on that ground he developed his fictional conception of the 
I. Moreover, Nietzsche stressed the practical usefulness of that concept and only 
rejected the idea of a causally efficacious I, that is, of an I as substance. In so 
doing, Nietzsche implicitly agrees with Vaihinger’s “critical” view, according to 
which it is important to consider the “verbal fictions” as “convenient aids” or 
“fruitful errors” (VAIHINGER, 1925: 169), with no need to completely get rid of 
them. In other words, both Nietzsche and Vaihinger think that we can keep on 
making reference to these concepts in our self- and world-description, but only 
by speaking as if they were existing copies of reality.  
Thus far, we have briefly given a general view of fictionalism as it 
emerges from Vaihinger’s main work. His philosophical view is also outlined in 
George S. R. Mead’s Quests Old and New (1913), a book that Pessoa read and that 
– as we can see from a note written in the flyleaf of Pessoa’s personal copy of 
Mead’s book – influenced his view of the subject. In the following section we 
shall argue that Pessoa also supported a psychological fictionalism and that his 
view can be compared with Nietzsche’s precisely because it is grounded on 
Vaihinger’s philosophical perspective. 
 
 
4. Pessoa: truth as a fiction 
The first section of Pessoa’s private library, labelled “Philosophy and 
Psychology,” consists of 163 books, less than half of which actually deal with 
purely philosophical topics. Among those books, we find works from Blaise 
Pascal, Herbert Spencer, and Alfred Espinas, all of which also Nietzsche read. 
Given the past studies on the correspondences between Nietzsche’s and 
Pessoa’s private libraries, this is not surprising.22 Nor are we surprised to find 
Pessoa’s name related with philosophical inquiries, since we know that he was 
interested in that field of study, and particularly, that he devoted himself to it 
during 1905-1906 and 1915-1916.23 Moreover, between 1915 and 1916 Pessoa 
read George R. S. Mead’s Quest Old and New, first published in 1913 (CFP, 1-
105). Mead was one of the main members of the Theosophical Society from 1884 
to 1909. He worked as a translator, editor, and historian and was particularly 
interested in the gnostic and hermetic drifts of ancient religions. In fact, a large 
part of his Quests Old and New is devoted to exactly that topic and the several 
underscores and reading marks that we find in Pessoa’s personal copy of that 
book show us that he found Mead’s investigations stimulating. But Pessoa’s 
interest was not limited to Mead’s dealing with ancient religions. Pessoa also 
deeply read the eleventh chapter of Quests Old and New, which is devoted to 
Vaihinger’s Philosophy of “As if”. 
Once more, the reading marks that we find in Pessoa’s personal copy of 
Mead’s book are revealing. They show us that Pessoa was particularly intrigued 
by Mead’s arguments that a) we can consider the world of the sense alone to be 
real, all else being only a fiction (MEAD, 1913: 248); b) the soul can be seen as an 
“organic enforming or plastic force” (MEAD, 1913: 254); and c) according to 
Vaihinger, “the division into inner and outer is simply an expedient of the 
psyche,” and “subject and object […] is at best an artificial and not a real 
division” (MEAD, 1913: 260).  
It is worth noting that Pessoa does more than underscore these passages 
of Mead’s book. In the flyleaf at the end of his personal copy of Quests Old and 
New there are some marginalia that reveal Pessoa’s particular interest in those 
topics. This document consists of two pages of rough observations, which can 
hardly be interpreted either as mere notes to the chapter on Vaihinger’s 
Philosophy of “As if”, or as the structure of a projected philosophical essay. 
Regardless, what is most interesting is the topic which Pessoa deals with in this 
flyleaf, that is, the rejection of the traditional contraposition between subject 
and object and of the view of consciousness as an objective phenomenon. 
Moreover, in stating the fictitious character and ontological inconsistency of 
notions such as “subject”, “I” and “(self-) consciousness”, Pessoa criticises the 
idea of a “pure subject” in a way that recalls Nietzsche’s criticism towards the 
concept of “pure mind.”24 Given the importance of this document, we publish it 




                                                 
22 On this, see e.g. GAGO (2009: 135-154). 
23 The first publication of Pessoa’s philosophical writings (PESSOA, 1968) showed his interest in 
philosophical inquiries. Starting from that book, several scholars carried on studies on that topic, and other 
more complete editions of Pessoa’s philosophical writings are forthcoming. 
24 In a posthumous fragment also quoted by Vaihinger. See above, § 1. 
25 The document has been transcripted by Antonio Cardiello, Patricio Ferrari, and Jerónimo Pizarro. 
English translation by Bartholomew Ryan. 
Vaihinger: Porque não dizer que o mundo externo é uma  Vaihinger: Why not say that the external world is a 
 ficção para lidarmos com o mundo abstracto?  fiction in order for us to deal with the abstract world? 
 
Assim como um objecto material pode ser ao  Just as a material object can be at 
mesmo tempo, e com egual realidade o que  the same time and with the same reality that which 
é exteriormente e no conjunto chimico e  is exterior and, together, chemically 
physico imperceptivel, assim tambem uma  and physically imperceptible; so also can a 
cousa pode ter côr e belleza com egual  thing have colour and beauty with the same 
“materialidade”, exterioridade.  “materiality” or exteriority. 
 
O sentimento do Eu? a /anticonsciencia?/ –  The feeling of the I? /anti-consciousness?/ – 
Depende de um sentido especial? Como?  It depends on a special meaning? Such as? 
 
O erro essencial é attribuir objectidade á consciencia.  The essential error is to attribute objectivity to consciousness. 
Todos outros erros são filhos d’este – são, melhor, só  All other errors are inheritors of this, and this alone. 
este. O erro é este, o erro em si.  The error is this: the error itself. 
 
O infinito é uma ficção como o metro ou o gramma.26  Infinity is a fiction like the metre or the gramma . 
A sua attitude é principalmente mathematica.  Its attitude is principally mathematics. 
 
Hypothese: Visto que Sujeito Puro é inexistente,  Hypothesis: Since the Pure Subject is non-existent, 
só pode existir Sujeito não-puro, sujeito-objecto. Isto é,  then the non-pure Subject can only exist, as subject-object.  
o sujeito é puro manifestar-se sem haver quê  That is, the subject is pure, manifested without having that 
que se manifeste. Não ha consciencia; isto é,  which is manifested. There is no such thing as consciousness;  
não ha consciencia-em si. Ha só conscientes. that is, there is no such thing as consciousness itself.  
 There are only the conscious. 
  
Só quando a consciencia obedece á lei da pluralidade  Only when consciousness obeys the law of plurality 
que é a 1ª lei da Realidade, só então a C[onscienci]a,  which is the 1st Law of Reality, then C[onscious]ness 
deixando de existir como consciencia, passa a  [5] ceases to exist as consciousness, it comes to 
existir como Realidade, passa a existir, tout  exist as Reality, it comes into being, tout 
court. Nos sentidos é que se /vive/, só nos sentidos. Não  court. It is through the senses that one/ lives/,  
ha sentido da Consciencia, mas só do eu consciente, through the senses alone. There is no 
só do erro sensual, só do eu enfim. meaning of Consciousness, but only of the conscious I, 
 only of the sensual error, only of the I itself. 
 
O erro é uma realidade limitada, ou, melhor,  The error is a limited reality, or, rather, 
relativa. (?) – O erro-sonho, o erro-erro (e.g. 2 + 2  it is relative. (?) - The dream-error, the error-error (e.g. 2 + 2 
= 5 em qualquer irrealidade de pensamento27), o erro-ficção  = 5 in any unreality of thought ), the fiction-error  
(e.g. infinito, gramma, metro) (e.g. infinity, gramma, metre) 
 
Erro-sonho: confusão  O erro é sempre  Dream-error: confusion  The error is always 
erro-erro = imperfeição de  uma imperfeição;  error-error = imperfection  An imperfection; 
sentidos etc  O sonho , de sen-  of meanings, etc.  The dream, of 
erro-ficção = □  tidos; o erro fiction-error = □  meaning; the error 
 de pensamento28; a   of thought; 
 ficção, de vontade. (?)   the fiction, of will. (?)  
 
This document clearly shows that Pessoa’s reading of Quests Old and New 
led him to strongly criticise a view of the subject as a substance, as an 
individuum, and this allows us to argue that he developed a fictionalist view of 
psychology. Indeed, in Pessoa’s observations we find the fundamental elements 
of the point of view that we sketched in sec. 1 and 2 of the present paper. As 
stated above, Pessoa claims that “the Pure-Subject is non-existent”, and argues 
that “the non-pure subject can only exist, as subject-object.” That is, Pessoa 
rejects the idea of a subject in itself, absolute, completely isolated. Rather, the 
only subject we can talk about is a subject that we know, and therefore 
                                                 
26 <kilogr> [↑ gramma].  
27 [↑ em qualquer irrealidade de pensamento] 
28 attenção [↑ pensamento] 
something that rises from a relationship and a creative process – the process of 
knowing. In that sense, according to Pessoa, the subject is an object. 
Furthermore, Pessoa criticises as an “error” the idea of “attribut[ing] objectivity 
to consciousness”. In his view, “there is no such thing as consciousness, […] as 
consciousness in itself,” but “there are only the conscious.” Thus, in agreement 
with some neo-Kantian positions that we also find in Vaihinger and Nietzsche, 
Pessoa conceives of consciousness as a process instead of as a substantive 
concept.  
We can find these psychological views developed in other philosophical 
fragments that Pessoa wrote between 1913 and 1916 and that testify his 
attempts to gain self-knowledge. Among these writings, we find a text that 
would have been an integration of the philosophical novel O Eremita da Serra 
Negra, signed by the fictitious writer Pero Botelho. Botelho worked between 
1912 and 1913, and foreran the age of sensacionismo and the attempts to take the 
dissolution of the subject as an aesthetic and philosophic ground, something 
that Pessoa developed in 1914 with Campos and the first orthonym statements. 
 
O sujeito ao ser pensado como sujeito é objecto... 
 
O29 não-ser para ser não-ser precisa ser, isto é, ter ser; isto é abstracto mas o argumento 
agora versa abstracções.30 Metaphysicamente, a inversa é igualmente certa. O ser para 
ser não-ser precisa não-ser. 
Isto vem tudo de que não-ser e ser são para nós idéas; nunca os podemos considerar 
absolutamente. Estão por isso sempre desmentindo-nos. Não são senão pensados. Ha 
sempre mesmo abysmo entre elles e a nossa idéa31 d’elles. […] O unico noumenon é o 
pensamento em si. […] O p[ensamento] deixa de ser em-si por ter objecto. A 
philosophia que é o pensamento reflexo, é acto divino regresso do mundo a Deus, pela 
consciencia da illusão32 (ou é a causa d’este sujeito a illusão d’elle, a fé que d’elle nasce). 
[…] o Universo não existe. O que existe não sabemos. O U[niverso] com as suas obras, o 
□ nem sequer é uma illusão. O sujeito puro é impensavel. As maiores abstracções — ser 
ou não-ser — são ellas proprias contradictorias e Objecto. (BNP/E3, 22-33 a 35; cf. 
PESSOA, 1968: 46-48) 
 
In this excerpt, Pessoa already criticises the idea of a “pure subject,” and 
states that both “self” and “not-self” are abstractions. Moreover, Pessoa argues 
that self and not-self are mutually fundamental. In fact, as we read in the 
second line of the quoted note, “o não-ser para ser não-ser precisa ser.” This 
claimleads to a non-metaphysical view of the objectivity of the subject to the 
idea that insofar as we think of a subject, we make an object out of it. What is 
particularly interesting for our present investigation is Pessoa’s focus on his 
own inner space. This attempt to gain a self-knowledge that accompanies the 
growth and development of his poetic and thinking activity – both from an 
                                                 
29 <Se> <o>/O\ 
30 isto é <abstracto> [↑ abstracto mas o argumento agora versa abstracções.] 
31 a [← nossa] idéa 
32 /acto divino regresso do mundo a Deus, pela consciencia da illusão/ 
aesthetic and a psychological point of view – is characterized by a view of the 
“I” as a non-substance concept.  
We find a first draft reflection on a psychic entity external to 
consciousness in the early poem Abdicação (1910), but only in two excerpts from 
1914 can we see the seeds of the following works. In these fragments Pessoa 
outlines a kind of individuality, or subject, which lays in the indefinite space 
between transcendence and immanence. This subject is therefore split between 
these two existential realms, and we cannot find it given the impermanency and 
indefiniteness of the place that hosts it. But that place is not unconscious. It is, 
rather, an extension of the consciousness, a kind of hyper-consciousness that 
bears the weight of that other which is this extended consciousness itself.  
 
Ficarei o Inferno de ser Eu, a Limitação Absoluta, Expulsão-Ser do Universo longinquo! 
Ficarei nem Deus, nem homem, nem mundo, mero vacuo-pessoa, infinito de Nada 
consciente, pavor sem nome, exilado do proprio mysterio, da propria Vida. Habitarei 
eternamente o deserto morto de mim, erro abstracto da creação que me deixou atraz. 
Arderá em mim eternamente, inutilmente, a ansia esteril do regresso a ser. 
Não poderei sentir porque não terei materia com que sinta, não poderei espirar alegria, 
ou odio, ou horror, porque não tenho nem a faculdade com que o sinta33, consciencia 
abstracta no inferno do não conter nada, Não-Conteúdo Absoluto, Suffocação absoluta 
e eterna!  
(BNP/E3, 20-47; cf. PESSOA, 1966: 60) 
 
Não sei quem sou, que alma tenho. 
 
Quando fallo com sinceridade não sei com que sinceridade fallo. Sou variamente34 outro 
do que um eu que não sei se existe, (se é esses outros). 
 
Sinto crenças que não tenho. Enlevam-me ancias que repudio. A minha perpetua 
attenção sobre mim perpetuamente me aponta traições de alma a um carater que talvez 
eu não tenha, nem ella julga que eu tenho. 
Sinto-me multiplo. Sou como um quarto com inumeros espelhos fantasticos que torcem 
para reflexões falsas uma unica anterior realidade que não está em nenhuma e está em 
todas. 
Como o pantheista se sente onda e astro e e flôr, eu sinto-me varios seres. Sinto-me 
viver vidas alheias, em mim, incompletamente, como se o meu ser participasse de todos 
os homens, incompletamente de cada, individuado por uma suma de não-eus 
synthetizados num eu postiço35.  
(BNP/E3, 20-67; cf. PESSOA, 2003: 151) 
 
In these excerpts, with a negative rhetoric which is peculiar to him, 
Pessoa argues that, in order to find the “true” self,36 one has to recognize and 
finally accept that his own subjectivity is far from being the origin of his psychic 
                                                 
33
 [↑ porque não tenho nem a faculdade com que o sinta] 
34 Sou <outro> variamente 
35 eu <postiço> postiço 
36
 The “self” Pessoa talks about, here, is not the one of common sense psychology, the egoistic one that 
hypostatize himself or the individual that, from time to time, he inhabits. It is not a substance self, but a 
dynamic and impermanent one. 
activity, or, least of all, the substantial reference of his self-knowledge. Similar 
to Nietzsche, in Pessoa we find the idea that the contraposition between “self” 
and “other” is internal to the subject, and we can thus talk – using an oxymoron 
– of a plural individuality. Due to this plurality, the subject cannot look at itself 
and find something fixed, nor even becoming that something fixed. On the 
contrary, in this game between the identical and the different, the 
independency of these two poles is preserved, and they give birth to an endless 
and ever-changing dynamic. Thus, the subject, the individual, looks at itself as a 
totality, as “mais diverso do que o universo espontaneo” (PESSOA, 2014: 176).  
In order to make this view of the self possible, Pessoa develops a poetics 
grounded on the epistemic value of intuitive feeling and knowing, a poetics 
that never restricts itself to a single voice, but looks for a chorus, a multiplicity 
of voices which are harmoniously related and generate a dynamic singularity. 
Moreover, his poetics is grounded on an equilibrium between the many sides of 
the Self, and stresses that anytime someone faces his own Self, he finds himself 
as different from the image he has of it. Pessoa’s attempt to approach something 
which is different from the knowing subject and cannot be reduced to an inert 
substance, along with his arguing that anything which is not internally plural is 
only an illusion, had noticeable effects on his later work.  Two fragments 
written between 1914 and 1916, attributable to Pero Botelho and Raphael 
Baldaya, are particularly interesting for this topic: 
 
Mas momentos tenho em que carnalmente sou idealista. 
Ante as cousas quedo-me1 □; vejo-as sem comprehender que as estou vendo, e do que é 
estar vendo. 
Á tona carnal da minha alma sobe37 o mysterio das cousas. Vejo, ouço, tacteio38 
alheiadamente ao que em mim vê, ouve e toca.  
Separei-me de mim de repente. Olho, de mim e de longe, as minhas sensações e ellas 
parecem, além de como que visiveis, pertencentes a outro, movendo-se em mim por 
obscenidade e por grandeza  
(PESSOA, 2013a: 352)  
 
 
Tudo é illusão. 
A illusão do pensamento, a do sentimento, a da vontade. Tudo é creação, e toda a 
creação é illusão. 
Crear é mentir.  
(BNP/E3, 22-32r; cf. PESSOA 1968: 44) 
 
The opening statement “tudo é illusão” (everything is illusion), from the 
philosophical fragment O Desconhecido, leads us back to Vaihinger and his 
fictionalist reading of Nietzsche. In The Philosophy of “As if”, Vaihinger states the 
purely fictive character of notions such as “point,” “surface,” “infinite,” 
“matter,” and “thing in itself:” these are all fictions to us, since we cannot 
attribute them a real existence, but rather, we use them as mere tools for our 





world-orientation and world-description, as-if they have an actual place in the 
world. According to Vaihinger, our practical life is grounded on a conventional 
belief, according to which we conceive a mere product of our intellect as if it 
were real. Thus, the relationship between the testimony of our senses – the 
“apparent” world, the only world that we can know – and the realm of fictions, 
acquires quite a new meaning. St stake here, is how to conceive the traditional 
concept of “truth.” According to Vaihinger, what we call “truth” is only a 
collection of necessary errors, without which we could not will, act, and judge – 
in a word: live. In agreement with Vaihinger, António Mora outlines the 
principles of his own aesthetics:  
 
Vivemos de ficções porém não ficticiamente. Fora de nós apprehendemos uma 
realidade exterior e um destino imutavel, nem justo nem injusto, alheio assim ao39 bem 
como ao mal, que nos rege a nós e a ella. Tudo mais fingimol-o ou sonhamol-o, é sonho 
consciente ou inconsciente. Fingimos e sonhamos para poder viver. Assim como não 
comemos nós a mor parte dos alimentos, assim tambem não vemos sem disfarce a mor 
parte do que chamamos factos. […] Não é sonho a vida: é-o, porém, toda interpretação 
da vida. [...] Ficção da intelligencia: creamos ficções puras, “força”, “matéria”, □ – 
cousas que nada são, nada representam, a nada40 correspondem: o materialismo e o 
idealismo, irmãos-gemeos, differentes apenas por não serem um só41. Força, materia, 
actos, tudo é ficção, e da ficção mais ficticia que pode haver, a ficção do abstracto que se 
julga correcto. [...] Vivemos pelos sentidos, convivemos42 pela intelligencia. Assim, pois, 
desligada dos sentidos, sendo que existe apenas para servil-os, a intelligencia opera no 
vacuo, é no vacuo de conhecer que43 convivemos e que nos entendemos uns aos outros. 
A vida social é uma ficção.  
(BNP/E3, 121-94 e 95r; cf. PESSOA, 2013b: 170-172) 
 
Moreover, after having described three kinds of fiction – religious and 
metaphysical, moral, and aesthetic – Pessoa concludes: “Servem as primeiras44 
de guiar-nos nas nossas relações universais; as segundas nas nossas relações 
sociais; as ultimas45 nas nossas relações com nós-proprios” (BNP/E3, 121-96r; 
PESSOA, 2013b: 172).  
Fictions are unreal, but they cannot identify the fictive character of the 
world in itself. Rather, they suggest that the world is moulded in a fictional 
drama. Thus, the reference to fictions as principle elements of that theatre that is 
our world, leads to the idea of poetry and writing as a philosophical method.  
Another consequence of this way of reasoning relates to the useful value 
that pertains to maintaining beliefs and theories of various sorts. In that context, 
the notion of truth is only a tool, whose truthfulness follows from its usefulness. 
Pessoa, also conceives of the truth as a tool. For him, she is in fact a symbol, she 
refers to something else. But there is no fixed reference, actually, and the truth 
                                                 
39 alheio [↑assim] ao 
40
 [↑a] nada 
41 em [↑por] não serem o mesmo [↑ serem um só] 
42 sentidos,  <convivemos> convivemos 
43 vacuo [↑ de conhecer] que 
44 [↑ Servem] As primeiras <servem> 
45 as <terce> ultimas 
only leads us to a view of knowledge as an everlasting process. In a fragment 
that should have been included in the preface of Ficções de Interlúdio, Pessoa 
shows us the method he thinks we can follow once we give up the traditional 
concept of truth as a “universally valid and binding designation of things” (to 
use Nietzsche’s words from On Truth and Lie in an Extra-moral Sense):  
 
Negada a verdade, não temos com que entreter-nos senão a mentira. Com ella nos 
entretenhamos, dando-a porém como tal, que não como verdade; se uma hypothese 
metaphysica nos occorre, façamos com ella, não a mentira de um systema (onde possa 
ser verdade) mas a verdade de um poema ou de uma novella - verdade em saber que é 
mentira, e assim não mentir.  
(BNP/E3, 28-22; cf. LOPES, 1990: II, 114)  
 
In this excerpt, Pessoa argues that truth and lies are both fictions. The 
subject of this judgement is the pretending artist, who sees the fictions as 
devices that make our relationship with the world possible and let us inhabit it 
and communicate with other people – given that, in art “honest” 
communication is not possible. Moreover, the context of this discourse is the 
generation of heteronyms. As is well-known, in Pessoa, heteronym is much 
more than a mere literary fiction and it cannot be reduced to a mere aesthetic 
resource. For him, heteronym puts the very notion of subject in question and 
looks at the dynamic, non-substantial conception of the self as a providing 
better access to our inner side, both from a psychological and an epistemic point 
of view. Moreover, heteronym leads to a new view of fiction itself: as for 
Pessoa, any product of our thought, and above all, the heteronyms, are real 
fictions (where “real” is assumed in the sense of the reality that Pessoa 
attributes to his heteronyms) that acquire a truth-value from their own 
existence as a field of thought. 
In other words, Pessoa thinks that to pretend does not mean to leave the 
realm of truth, that is, the hypothetical individual identity of our personal 
existence. When we pretend, we enter a realm where our activity generates 
what we call “truth.” In that realm, honesty is the place where we are always 
absent and the name of the heteronym that, time-after-time is regarded as 
someone other than the actual writer, is a symbol for that place. From that point 
of view, “truth” is subordinate to the moral commitment according to which 
any thought must be seen as a fiction, that is, as regarding only a limited field of 
truth. 
With all this in mind, Pessoa, pretending to be who he actually was, 
invites us to feel everything in every way in order to manage the multiple 
characters of the subject by incorporating what we perceive as other than us. 
Once we understand that it is not possible to give up the fictions, Pessoa not 
only stresses the creative character of life, but also asks us to choose a life that 
cannot be chosen. In fact, as António Mora remarks, “força é que finjamos esse 
destino, para nos guiarmos na vida” (BNP/E3, 121-94v; PESSOA, 2013b: 171). 
 
5. Conclusions 
Our investigation of Nietzsche’s and Pessoa’s views of the subject led to several 
outcomes. First of all, as argued above, we can argue that both authors defend a 
psychological fictionalism, that is, they both consider psychological entities 
such as subject, I, ego, or soul as mere creations of thought whose metaphysical 
objectivity must be rejected. Their views agree with some inquiries from the late 
nineteenth century, inquiries that developed Kant’s psychological investigation 
in a purely scientific way. We can properly talk about a “fictionalist” view and 
attribute it to both Nietzsche and Pessoa, for the latter had an indirect 
knowledge of Vaihinger’s “system of the theoretical, practical and religious 
fictions of mankind,” while Nietzsche – the “Kantian Nietzsche” – is a primary 
reference of Vaihinger himself. Furthermore, it is worth noting that this 
fictionalist psychology is only the starting point of both Nietzsche’s and 
Pessoa’s work. Both of them developed some original philosophical reflections 
and, for Pessoa, an original poetics, on the ground of their criticism towards the 
traditional substance-subject distinction. Thus, they both prove to have been 
capable of growing the seeds of an epistemological debate that has been often 
criticized as less philosophically relevant. 
The second outcome pertains to Pessoa-studies and follows from what 
we have just stated. The document found in the flyleaf of Mead’s book is one 
more testimony of the deeply philosophical content of Pessoa’s literary 
production. Moreover, that document proves that Pessoa’s philosophical 
observations are not just scattered thoughts, mere intuitions on philosophically 
relevant topics. On the contrary, these thoughts arise from Pessoa’s interest in a 
rich and wide debate that was particularly fertile between the end of the 
nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth-century. 
Finally, the correspondence between Nietzsche’s and Pessoa’s views of 
the subject isof recent interest for several scholars. Our research shows that this 
correspondence can be explained by making reference to the cultural context of 
these two authors, to the debate they both made reference to. Thus, there is no 
need for thinking that Pessoa could have read (directly or indirectly) some of 
Nietzsche’s statements on that particular topic. On the contrary – and this is our 
argument – Pessoa sometimes just reflects on basic assumptions or on some 
main outcomes of the scientific and philosophical investigations of his time, 
investigations that developed the debate that interested Nietzsche and that also 
strongly influenced his thought. 
This last outcome leads to a final methodological conclusion. Insofar as 
we can shed light on Pessoa’s literary and poetic production by making 
reference to some of the texts he read, and on the content of which he deeply 
reflected (but scarcely mentions, also in his manuscripts), an investigation of the 
sources of Pessoa’s work is therefore of primary importance. Moreover, Pessoa-
studies could follow the path of European Nietzsche-studies and try to focus on 
what Mazzino Montinari (the “father” of the critical edition of Nietzsche’s 
writings) called the “extra-text.”46 With this expression Montinari points to 
what lays beyond the text but is nevertheless deeply involved in the genesis of 
the text itself (e.g. a book or an ongoing debate). According to Montinari, most 
of the time this “extra-text” is “more relevant than what we read in the text 
itself,” since the meaning of the text, its real content, its significance, lays in 
what the author left unexpressed. The present research is an example of this 
kind of investigation. From a name that appears in a marginal text, we can 
draw out the picture of a wide network which lays unexpressed under the 
surface of Pessoa’s published texts. That network connects Pessoa to many 
other authors, some of whom are related to him in surprising ways, and gives 
meaning to his statements and aesthetic choices. In doing this, we can 
appreciate the richness of Pessoa’s literary production, the intensity of his view 
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